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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 2002, a banking holiday marked the pinnacle of a 45 percent run on bank deposits in the Uruguayan economy, peaking the worst banking crisis the country has ever known. At the same time, Uruguayan country risk reached 3099 bps, a figure unknown for a country that just five months earlier was on the investment grade range according to the most prestigious rating agencies. Considering the run on the currency experienced early in 2002, by July Uruguay had suffered a "triplet" crisis, i.e. a currency crisis, a public debt crisis, and a panic in the banking sector.
Not even the largest financial package ever engineered by the IMF, in terms of GDP, could save the country from the record breaking fall in deposits, the restructuring of deposits in public banks and a comprehensive restructuring in public debt. Down the road, two attempts to stop the crisis failed, leading to an unprecedented fall in GDP of 10.8 percent, the largest one-year fall ever recorded in Uruguayan history.
On July 27 th , eight months after the start of the crisis, Uruguay went into a four-day banking holiday. In that period, under a program supported by the IMF, four banks were closed and time deposits in public banks were rescheduled and the restructuring of public debt was decided. Ten months later, the economy started to show signs of what is now acknowledged as a firm recovery on all fronts. In the twelve months following the restructuring of public debt, GDP rose by 12.7 percent, inflation went down to 10 percent, the primary surplus reached 4.1 percent and the financial system recovered US$800 million of deposits.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we would argue that, despite the fact that some elements of contagion were present, irrational behavior should not be regarded as the main explanation for the Uruguayan collapse. Financial fragility, due to liability dollarization and a misdesigned safety net, together with the strong real exchange rate depreciation and spillover effects derived from the Argentinean crisis (namely, fall of regional demand, fall in terms of trade, solvency issues in the financial sector linked to investments in Argentina, and financial contagion), led to a rational simultaneous run on both the domestic banking system and the public debt (sudden stop). The link between fiscal accounts and the banking sector (implicit deposit insurance supported by the Public Finances) will be stressed. Secondly, we will look at the crisis resolution strategies and see why the first two attempts failed despite the large backup from International Financial Institutions, and the third succeeded. Finally, we will take a look at the recovery of the Uruguayan economy and point out some basic lessons to be learned from this experience.
II. URUGUAY IN THE NINETIES: INVESTMENT GRADE AND STRUCTURAL FRAGILITY
In 1997, Uruguay reached investment grade status behind what appeared to be very strong figures of growth and fiscal performance. The investment grade marked the pinnacle of a gradual process of macroeconomic reforms that started in the early 1990s. The reforms tackled a rather wide set of issues ranging from monetary policy to trade policy. Nevertheless, behind the improvements that helped Uruguay reach investment grade status laid a severe case of financial fragility, enhanced by an unsustainable regional boom. For that reason, it is not necessary to resort to irrational behavior to explain the crisis experienced by Uruguay in 2002.
A. Trade, Mercosur and the Regional Bubble
The first macro pillar of the reforms of the 1990s was Mercosur. Uruguay, following the lead of Brazil and Argentina, entered the trade agreement aiming to use it as a platform that would enhance the chances of survival of Uruguayan enterprises in a framework of increasing trade openness, thereby reducing the social cost of foreign competition. The Uruguayan strategy was to open up to Mercosur first and then open up Mercosur to the world 3 .
However, even if it could be argued that Mercosur succeeded in developing trade between member countries, the process of opening up to the world never took place. After the signing of the treaty of Ouro Preto (1994), a tariff convergence schedule was put in place that worked effectively until 1998. The common external tariff, instead of declining over time, rose in 1998 to accommodate the needs of Brazil, never to be reduced again.
As expected, trade with Mercosur grew steadily between 1990 and 1998, taking the region's share of Uruguay's total exports in terms of goods and services from 45 percent in 1990 to 67 percent in 1998. Down the road, Uruguay became more closed to the rest of the world.
The export concentration process was enhanced by the implementation of exchange rate based stabilization plans in the region that boosted regional demand. Argentina started the Convertibility Plan in 1990, Uruguay introduced a target zone in 1991 4 and Brazil commenced the Real Plan in 1994.
The stabilization plans and the Mercosur process were fostered by large inflows of capital to the region until 1997, which favored the appreciation of regional currencies.
It has been argued that in Uruguay, the resulting consumption boom in the region led to a "Dutch disease" type of effect. Given the close links between Uruguay and the region, particularly Argentina, a large portion of what usually would be non-tradable goods turned into regional goods. Then, when there was an increase in regional demand, this led to increases in regional prices, and an appreciation of the domestic currency, that crowded out tradable production 5 .
That expansion turned out to be unsustainable, and ended with the abandonment of the Real Plan in 1999 and later on with the collapse of the Convertibility Plan in Argentina in 2001. However questionable, it is possible to characterize ex post what happened in the region in the 1990s as a bubble, or a transitory situation. In this type of economy, if the aim is to mitigate the negative effect on the tradable sector, control of aggregate spending is needed, which means strict control of both public and private consumption behavior. In the next sections we will see that neither of the two conditions was actually met.
B. The Fiscal Front
On the fiscal side, three important measures were implemented to improve the prospect of debt sustainability: i) Fiscal adjustment plans were enacted in early 1990 and early 1995, to compensate for increases in public expenditure and investments in the previous electoral years and the impact on revenues from downturns in economic activity in 1989 and the "tequila effect" in 1994; ii) Renegotiation of public external debt in the framework of the Brady Plan in February 1991 relieved the pressure of interest payments; and iii) The 1995 reform of the pension system transformed a pure pay-as-you-go system into a mixed one that combined a capitalization system with a segment of pay-as-you-go 6 . According to the projections made at the time, despite having a medium term fiscal cost, in the long run the reform should have brought about a GDP reduction of 3-5.5 percent in social security outlays (Masoller and Rial, 1997; Forteza, 1999) .
At the time these measures appeared to be a rather orderly management of public accounts. After peaking at 7.4 percent of GDP in 1989, fiscal deficit figures dropped to the 1-2 percent range between 1997 and 1998. commitment to achieve stability in the value of the Uruguayan peso and limited the capability of financing the Central Government.
However, the improvement in fiscal performance as measured by usual definitions of fiscal deficit fails to show the real situation of the public sector's accounts. Graph 1 shows how the fiscal result would have changed had the government stuck to a constant rate of growth for real expenditures. To perform the exercise we assume a 3 percent growth of GDP, which arguably is a conservative assumption regarding the rate of growth of potential GDP (Bucacos, 1997) . If we start from a "normal" year, this rule should ensure a fiscal balance over the business cycle. According to this cyclically adjusted fiscal result, the pro-cyclical behavior of public accounts led to an accumulation of debt of almost 22 percent between 1993 and 2001. Dollarization of public debt plays an important role in the pro-cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. One first effect is direct and comes from the real cost of interest rate payments. As the real exchange rate appreciates during expansions, serving the interest payments of public debt becomes easier than it would have been had the real exchange rate evolved differently. A second effect arises from the relationship between the risk premium and the debt to GDP ratio. A cheaper dollar results in a larger GDP in dollar terms, resulting in an apparent reduction in the indebtedness of a country and in a lower risk premium.
During the 1990s, the Uruguayan debt to GDP ratio fell by 26 percent of GDP to reach 30 percent in 1998. Since the stock of debt in dollars did nothing but rise during that period, the full burden of the adjustment was due to the increase of GDP in dollar terms.
After 1998, public accounts suffered a three-year period of recession that affected public revenues. Starting with the fall in Brazilian demand derived from the abandonment of the Real Plan in January 1999, Uruguay experienced a succession of negative shocks that deteriorated the fiscal result. The government, while trying to control expenditures, allowed the fiscal deficit to reach 4 percent of GDP between 1999-2001, further increasing the debt to GDP ratio to 54 percent in 2001.
C. The Financial Fragility of the Banking System
The lack of confidence in domestic monetary policies after four decades of high inflation and successive failures in attempts to reduce it, naturally led to the extended use of foreign currency as a substitute for the peso, thereby allowing a sharp increase in the dollarization of financial instruments during the last quarter of the 20 th century .
The business cycle associated with the exchange-rate-based stabilization plan and the renewed access to markets for voluntary sovereign debt in a context of high international liquidity gave banks stimulus to expand dollar-denominated credit to the private sector, which doubled between 1994 and 1998 7 .
The currency blindness of the regulation and the implicit guarantees to both debtors and depositors of the banking system provided a perverse set of incentives that prevented risk perception. Debtors were not afraid of taking credit in dollars both because there was a target zone for the exchange rate that was preannounced (exchange rate guarantee), and because experience told them that should anything happen with the monetary arrangement, the government would bail them out by law as it had done in the past. Depositors did not care about the quality of the banks' portfolios because there was an implicit guarantee on deposits. With this set of incentives, regulation could have avoided risk-taking behavior, but it did not. Capital requirements and provisions did not take into account the currency mismatch.
At the same time, Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay (BHU) -a state-owned mortgage bankstarted in the second half of the eighties to accept deposits in dollars. This became their main source of funding to lend in UR (Unidades Reajustables), a wage-indexed unit.
All these factors contributed to a rapid growth of credit, based on a mismatch of currencies. While the BHU assumed the risk in its own portfolio, for private banks the currency risk became a part of their credit risk as they lent in dollars to agents with income in pesos.
Graph 2 shows the increase in the currency mismatch problem, relating the measurable mismatches in the banks' portfolios, public debt and in the BHU to GDP. Financial fragility derived from currency mismatches grew steadily to reach the 80 percent mark just prior to the crisis. In terms of credit, close to 100 percent of credit to the public sector and 70 percent of credit to the private sector suffered from a currency mismatch problem, setting the stage for a solvency issue on the portfolios of the banking system and the public sector.
D. Banking for Argentineans
Traditionally, the Uruguayan banking system has accommodated the needs of Argentineans as well as Uruguayan customers. Based on banking secrecy and a tradition of stability and respect for deposits that contrasted sharply with that of the Argentinean banking system, Uruguay was able to seduce Argentinean investors. As a result, deposits of Argentineans have been for decades a large part of the banking business in Uruguay.
Starting in the eighties and mainly in the nineties, these financial linkages led naturally to a process of branch creation of Argentinean banks in Uruguay, and of Uruguayan banks in Argentina. International banks also had branches in both countries.
As a result, there was a potential for a large cross-border risk in banks' portfolios, which was not captured by Uruguayan regulation, leaving the management of that risk to the internal policies of individual banks.
Not surprisingly, the Uruguayan branches of private regional banks, as any bank with a presence in the Argentinean market, had a large exposure in their portfolios to both public and private credit in that country. Most affected by this exposure were Banco Galicia, Banco Comercial and Banco de Montevideo-La Caja Obrera, all of which were among the top four private banks in Uruguay in terms of their total assets by the end of 2001.
E. The Link Between Public Accounts and the Banking Sector
By December 2001 there was an obvious link between the public sector and the banking system derived from the fact that the State owned banks accounted for more of 40 percent of total deposits. Besides Banco de la República and BHU, the Corporación Nacional para el Desarrollo (CND) was the main stockholder of Banco de Crédito and Banco La Caja Obrera, two small banks that survived out of the government guarantee.
At the same time, despite not having a risk-based approach to properly capitalize credit to the public sector, private banks did not have a significant exposure to the government in their portfolios. After the 1982 crisis, banking regulation forced banks to invest in Uruguayan bonds, even as reserves. Over time, mainly after Uruguay entered the Brady Plan in 1991, this type of regulation started to ease, reducing the share of the banks' portfolios invested in credit to the government.
However, the existence of an implicit deposit insurance scheme, the legacy of two generations of bailouts in banking crises, crucially linked the health of the accounts of the public sector and the private banking system. 8 There was the perception among economic agents that, should anything happen in the banking system, the government would bail them out. This implicit guarantee, in turn, became a potential liability of the state. What nobody took into account was the vicious circle this link would generate in the event of a real exchange rate shock: a sharp increase in the real value of dollars would damage the solvency of the banks. If the guarantee of the government were strong, the banking sector could avoid a run. However, due to the dollarization of public debt, the most likely scenario is one in which the sustainability of public debt would also be questionable. The result would be a vicious circle in which the realization of potential liabilities in the banking sector would worsen public accounts, which in turn would erode the value of the implicit deposit insurance scheme, and deepen the run on the banking sector. Then, if the shock were large enough, the capital of banks and the guarantee of the government would evaporate at the same time, leading to simultaneous runs on the banking sector and public debt.
The photo of Uruguay we have just depicted is one of both structural and short-term fragility. The country was fragile structurally due to the liability dollarization problem. In the short term, fragility was the result of a problem of expectations derived from the recession that started in 1999 The financial turmoil generated by the Asian and Russian crises affected Uruguay through the reduction in Brazilian and Argentinean demand. Data on sovereign spreads show that, despite an initial reaction of the Uruguayan spread to the financial news coming from Asia and Russia, Uruguayan premiums remained low (see Graph 3). In fact, after the Asian crisis, Uruguay intensified its strategy of maturity enlargement through global bond issues, a clear sign that financial markets remained open. Both Brazil and Argentina, on the other hand, showed clear signs of a reversal in financial flows (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2002) .
Fears of the abandonment of the Real Plan and the probable spillovers to the region drove Uruguayan spreads above the 200 basis points mark by the end of 1998. Although the collapse of the Real Plan did generate a clear increase in Uruguayan spreads, this effect eventually faded during 1999.As a response to the crisis, the Uruguayan government changed the preannounced schedule of the reduction of the target zone's drift, postponing indefinitely in April 1999 a 0.4 percent per month reduction. Uruguay managed to generate with this measure an 11 percent dollar deflation in wholesale prices in 1999, and showed a degree of flexibility in the management of relative price adjustment when compared with Argentina.
As the likelihood of an Argentinean collapse rose 9 , Uruguay tried to answer by allowing more room for relative price adjustment. By mid 2001 both the slope and the width of the target zone were doubled to reach 6 percent and 1.2 percent per month respectively. The markets responded well to the increased flexibility of the exchange rate policy. However, it was clear at that time that a long-term fiscal adjustment was needed to ensure the sustainability of fiscal policy. Furthermore, some structural issues like the losses generated by the liability dollarization of theBHU's portfolio became issues of public concern.
The relative price adjustment implied by the Argentinean crash meant that most likely both the financial sector and the public accounts were no longer on sustainable paths.
After the float of the Argentinean peso in early January 2002, the Uruguayan government decided to take two main steps. First, both the drift and the width of the band were doubled again, to reach 2.4 percent and 12 percent per month respectively. Originally scheduled to last until June, by early April it was determined that the measure would extend until December. Besides, a proposal for a US$ 400 million dollar fiscal adjustment was sent to Congress. It was expected that those two signals, together with a communication policy directed to ensure institutions would be respected, would suffice to keep expectations aligned with the sustainability of public debt, and keep international financial markets open.
However, in the days that followed, those measures would prove to be totally inadequate. The spillovers from Argentina, and the discovery of unlawful practices in Banco Comercial gave rise to the idea that Uruguay would end up following in the footsteps of its neighbor.
B. The Spillovers From Argentina and the First Stage of the Crisis
After the enactment of the "corralito" in early December 2001, Banco de Galicia, the Uruguayan branch of the Argentinean bank of the same name, started to lose deposits. Banco de Galicia's solvency was under severe scrutiny in Argentina, and people started to withdraw deposits from the branch in Uruguay, which was not limited by the withdrawal ceilings of the "corralito" (see Graph 4). By late December, rumors of delinquent risk practices at Banco Comercial triggered the run on this bank.
The first reaction of the Argentinean depositors was consistent with a "flight to quality" inside Uruguay. Data of bank deposits show that the rest of the system, mainly public and international banks, gained deposits up to early February.
10
Private banks did not lose deposits until mid January when Standard & Poors changed the outlook of the Uruguayan rating to negative. Even then, public banks kept on increasing deposits.
Although Banco de Galicia had built a strong liquidity position in Uruguay just prior to the crisis, by early February the bank was in serious financial difficulty, and was unable to collect its assets from its headquarters in Buenos Aires due to the "corralito". On February 13 th , Banco Central del Uruguay suspended the operations of Banco de Galicia.
After this incident, four factors played an important role in the deterioration of the Uruguayan situation. First, Standard & Poors downgraded Uruguay out of the investment grade range on February 14 th . Secondly, the communication of the suspension of Banco de Galicia by the Uruguayan authorities was unclear, and conveyed the impression that Argentinean deposits were not being treated in the same manner as resident deposits.
Furthermore, the lack of information on the solvency situation of Uruguayan banks gave the impression that the problem was generalized. Finally, the media in Argentina, influenced by their national experience, announced that a "corralito" had been installed in Uruguay. By February 14, the run on the banking system became a panic. As graph 5 shows, there was a sharp acceleration in the rate of deposit withdrawals after February 13.
The government responded by putting political pressure on Congress to accelerate the approval of the fiscal adjustment, by augmenting the stand-by facility with the IMF, and by negotiating the "capitalization" of Banco Comercial with its shareholders. The commitment to the exchange rate band was maintained. The government tried to give the impression to the public that the problem on the banking sector was only in the two banks already identified as being in trouble. In the case of Banco Comercial, which was the biggest private commercial bank measured by the size of its domestic assets, an agreement was reached between the government and the three main remaining stockholders (J.P. Morgan, Credit Suisse First Boston, and Dresdner Bank) by which each of the four parts contributed US$ 33 million to capitalize the bank (a total of US$ 133 million).
On February 28, Congress approved a series of additional taxes, supporting the government's efforts to reduce the deficit. It was estimated that the tax measures would provide additional revenues for close to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2002. Public services concessions would provide additional revenues for 0.3 percent of GDP. On the other hand, non-interest expenditures were expected to fall by nearly 1.5 percent of GDP.
On March 25, the Uruguayan government signed a new stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund in the amount of SDR 594.1 million (about US$ 743 million). The stand-by credit was intended to support the country's economic program during 2002-04. Uruguay had already drawn SDR 122.6 million (about US$ 153 million) from this facility.
Despite the significant reduction in the speed of withdrawals, these measures failed to stop the run for several reasons.

Even after the fiscal adjustment law was passed on February 28, the perception was that the fiscal situation was not on a sustainable path.
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
The capitalization of Banco Comercial was rather obscure. The press reported openly the disappearance of around US$ 400 million from the bank's portfolio, while the "capitalization" agreement was only for one third of that amount. Furthermore, it took over a month for the money for this capitalization to arrive, thereby damaging the perception of commitment that was needed.
The new program with the IMF was inappropriate for three reasons. First, the amount involved in the program seemed small compared to the loss of reserves experienced (US$550 million on average per month in January-February). Second, as will become clear in the second stage of the crisis, the traditional path of IMF disbursements is totally unfit to cope with the liquidity needs generated by a crisis like the one experienced in Uruguay. Third, the IMF's willingness to give decisive support to Uruguay was unclear after the abandonment of Argentina in November 2001.
 Finally, the government failed to divulge the strategy it was following to solve the problem, and showed at some moment clear signs of lack of coordination and mismanagement of public communications.
The financial crisis deepened in April and May, after the banking holiday in Argentina, the increasing rumors of a Brazilian default on its debt, the sharp downgrades in Uruguayan ratings by Moody's and Standard & Poors and a variety of comments in the press about the weakness of the banking system.
C. On the Eve of the Banking Holiday
In early May Uruguay started to negotiate a change of strategy with the IMF that would be based on the following principles:
 Transition to a floating exchange rate with a monetary policy based on the management of monetary aggregates.  Measures to restore confidence in the Banking system, which should include:
 Restructuring of Public Banks.  Creation of the FFSB (Fondo de Fortalecimiento del Sistema Bancario), a government agency in charge of both restructuring private banks and providing liquidity if necessary.  Strengthening of the Superintendence of Financial Institutions, particularly on the supervisory front.  Improving the soundness of fiscal accounts both in the short and long run
The measures for the banking system would be financed by the augmentation of the drawing rights of Uruguay to DEG 1,152 million (US$ 1.5 billion), and further financing from the World Bank and the IDB for an estimated US$ 1.1 billion.
By the end of May, the announcement of the augmentation of the program with the IMF had a visible impact on the financial situation. Country risk fell, and so did the speed of deposit withdrawals. The approval of the so-called "Fiscal Stability Law" in an impressive one-week period contributed to an easing of the financial situation.
But two policy measures would trigger panic again: the float of the currency on June 19, and the intervention of Banco de Montevideo the day after. At the same time, Uruguay presented the Letter of Intent to be considered by the Board of the IMF. In the days that followed, the speed of deposit withdrawals would accelerate. A US$ 500 million disbursement by the IMF evaporated in less than a week from the reserves of the Central Bank. The political support of the Uruguayan Executive crumbled as it became obvious that the mega-package with IFIs was not enough to solve the problem.
Increasing political pressure and the evident deterioration of the financial situation led to the resignation of the Minister of Finance, and the entire board of the Central Bank on July 22. A new economic team was put in place two days later. On the same day, a team from the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank and the OPP flew to Washington to negotiate a new program. The speed of withdrawals forced Uruguay into a banking holiday on July 29.
The strategy posed by the June Plan failed for several reasons.
i.
The float of the currency, designed to both preserve reserves and correct the relative price misalignement, was, to say the least, untimely. a) There was no pressure on the exchange rate market. After losing US$ 100 million in early January, the Central Bank did not lose any reserves on the exchange rate market. Reserves fell due to the banking panic and the debt crisis. b) It worsened the lack of confidence in the banking sector. Since most of the credit of the banking sector was given to agents with income in pesos, it was now clear that banks would have to face a sharp increase in non-performing loans. c) It marked a focal point for debtors, who became conscious that the problem was generalized, and started to behave as lobbies. This moral hazard effect worsened credit risk, and the balance sheet of banks. d) Since all public debt was in dollars, the float made it clear that the government was broke, severely questioning the capability of the public sector to further assist banks (public banks in particular). e) It was a clear sign of lack of control. A couple of months earlier the minister of finance and the president of the Central Bank had given an assurance that the exchange rate system would be kept until the end of 2004.
ii. The intervention of Banco de Montevideo-La Caja Obrera, which may have been justified for supervisory reasons, was perceived as just the beginning of a series of interventions with an unknown end: a) The balance sheets of banks available to the public were more than nine months old, making it difficult to distinguish between good and bad banks. b) The commitment of international banks to the region was damaged by their reactions to the Argentinean experience. c) The public was aware of at least a couple of other institutions, those that would be closed later on, that could follow the same path. d) The problems of public banks were already notorious, and the public's perception of their liquidity was chained to the evolution of the International Reserve Assets of the Central bank.
IV. CRISIS RESOLUTION STRATEGY
iii. The August Plan: Rationale and Even though the size of the financing by the IFIs was rather large, the schedule of disbursements followed the traditional drop-by-drop IMF pattern, a procedure that neither fitted the needs to stop a banking panic nor gave confidence regarding the commitment of the IMF to the program.
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iv. The timing of the enactment of the strategy was inadequate. The float was a precondition to the discussion of the plan by the IMF, introducing a lag between the implementation of the float and introduction of the measures in the banking sector. This prevented the presentation of the float and the measures as being part of the same strategy. v. Despite the two fiscal adjustments, there were serious doubts about the sustainability of public accounts. vi. Communications were also mishandled. Leaving aside the previous point, it was unclear how the program would be communicated to indicate that action was being taken to cope with the two main issues that had generated the financial collapse: the public debt and banking crisis. vii. The credibility of the economic team was damaged by the failure of its previous attempts to solve the problem.
A. Implementation
The declaration of a banking holiday on July 30 and the implementation of the August Plan meant a significant change in the banking system strategy of the government. Instead of providing liquidity to try to keep financial institutions operating and -in some circumstancesinjecting capital into them through the Fund for Fortifying the Banking System (FFBS), (leaving for a later stage the restructuring of the banking sector), the new strategy involved the use of all available financing to back only those deposits related to the payment system. This goal comprised: i) the immediate suspension of the activities of the insolvent banks; ii) the extension of the maturity of dollar time deposits in the public banks (República and Hipotecario) and iii) the preservation of the payment system, with full backing of sight and savings deposits (in local and foreign currency) in the public and the suspended private banks. This last issue was implemented through the creation of a Fund for Stability of the Banking System (FSBS), filled with almost US$ 1.5 billion secured through the support of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 13 .
12 The Argentinean experience in 2001 showed that the IMF could just cut the financing at any point. 13 To reopen the banks on August 5 th , before the IMF's Board gave final approval of the program, a US$ 1.5 billion bridge loan from the United States government was secured.
The design of the new strategy aimed to address the main determinants of the banking panic, giving full backing to the dollar -denominated deposits in the system that remained free (including the sight and savings deposits in the suspended banks) through the immediate availability of the resources of the FSBS 14 . The deposits in pesos in the public banks were supported by the Central Bank as lender of last resort in domestic currency, while in the suspended banks the Central Bank was allowed to surrogate the rights of the depositors in sight and savings deposits in pesos, complying with the goal of preserving the payment system 15 .
The up-front full backing of freed deposits together with the reprogramming of time deposits in public banks ensured the availability of enough liquidity to resist any withdrawal demand in public banks and to allow the reallocation of sight and saving deposits in insolvent banks. It was expected that deposit withdrawals in the other private banks, the "good" banks, which in general met minimum dollar liquidity requirements and had positive net worth, would be supported by themselves or -in the cases of foreign subsidiaries and branches -backed by their headquarters.
The rationale behind this strategy was quite clear. To strengthen the confidence of economic agents in the Uruguayan banking system, the authorities designed a framework under which, even in the worst case scenario, the banking system would have been able to withstand the withdrawal of deposits. This was an important first difference with the implementation and functioning of the previous FFSB, through which the amount of US$ 2.5 billion was not immediately available and covered only a fraction of the deposits of the domestic banks, public and private.
This final effort by the Uruguayan authorities 16 to stabilize the financial system required a shock to expectations that required not only the full up-front backing of the freed deposits -a 14 According to data available at that time, at the beginning of the Banking holiday, on July 30 th , sight and savings dollar -denominated deposits in BROU and BHU were US$ 1,040 millions, while US$ 406 millions stood for the sight and savings dollar deposits in the suspended banks Comercial, Caja Obrera, Montevideo and Crédito. 15 The authorization to the Central Bank to surrogate the rights of certain depositors against the suspended banks was given by the Law 17523. That Law also created the FSBS, authorized the Government to make advances to dollar -denominated sight and saving deposits in the suspended banks and established the reprogramming of the dollar time deposits in the public banks by up to three years. Peso time deposits were not rescheduled. 16 The difficulties faced by the Uruguayan government to obtain the acceptance from the IFIs, specially the IMF, on an augmentation and acceleration of disbursements to finance the Plan reflected the reluctance to continue putting money in Uruguay to finance the capital outflow.
necessary but not sufficient condition -but also the introduction of a firewall between "good" and "bad" banks in the financial system. This is a second important difference between the August Plan and the FFBS strategy. To change the negative expectations, it was necessary not only to improve the "picture" through the full coverage of deposits at the end of the banking holiday, but also to establish consistent dynamics after August 5 th . If insolvent banks had been allowed to continue operations, their economic imbalances would have undermined sooner or later the basis of the coverage given by the FSBS, triggering a new panic 17 .
Not only a firewall between "good" and "bad" banks was needed, but also between the funds devoted to crisis management and resolution and the international reserves, which in turn introduced a separation between developments in the banking and the fiscal sector. Consequently, a third difference between the implementation and functioning of the FSBS and the failed FFBS lay in its constitution as an escrow account, separated from the international reserves. Through this mechanism, the support to the sight and savings deposits did not contaminate the management of international reserves, which under this new arrangement were completely devoted to back the liabilities of the Central Bank with the financial institutions and to provide international liquidity for the government debt services.
The main risk of the August plan was the possibility that any of the private banks that reopened on August 5 th could not resist a new wave of withdrawals. That situation may have arisen if local branches and subsidiaries lacked support from their headquarters or if the remaining national banks, mostly cooperatives, faced a shortage in the liquidity available.
However, this risk seemed relatively small when compared with the commitment to the Uruguayan economy showed by the headquarters of the international banks 18 . Moreover, the Central Bank minimized that risk by being very restrictive in the conditions imposed on banks in order to reopen 19 . According to data that was made publicly available a few days after the end of the banking holiday, there was a clear distinction in terms of solvency and liquidity between the banks that continued operations after August 5 th and those suspended 20 .
To contribute to the strengthening of the liquidity situation of the banking system, the Central Bank increased the legal reserve requirements, first imposing a marginal one hundred percent on the increase of the deposits, effective in August, which was transformed to an increase in the average requirement from September 21 . The reserve requirements were raised both for dollar and domestic currency deposits, the latter being justified for monetary policy reasons 22 .
Another regulatory change, effective from September 2002, was the introduction of liquidity restrictions on non -resident deposits. Before then, regulations only established a single reserve requirement for all dollar deposits, the exception being the receipts drawn abroad by the bank, in which case no minimum reserve was applied. The illiquid nature of many assets funded by non -resident deposits in the cases of the banks that would eventually fail, especially after the introduction of capital controls in Argentina, explains the difficulties they faced at the very beginning of the panic. The new regulation did not introduce minimum reserve requirements for non -resident deposits if they were drawn abroad, but required that at least 30% of those funds be placed in high quality instruments. Other regulations to be introduced later on would take into consideration country and operational risk issues that were also present in the banks that failed during the crisis of 2002.
The August Plan was designed not only to effectively stop the withdrawal of deposits but also to help the recovery of the banking sector in particular and the Uruguay economy in general. For that reason, the defense of the payment system, even under the great pressure that the closing of four national banks would imply, was a cornerstone of the new strategy 23 . The access of the public banks to the resources of the FSBS was relatively easy to implement and control, but the transfer of the funds expressed as sight and saving deposits in the suspended banks was a tough and overwhelming task. It required the involvement of thousands of people through the windows of the suspended banks to obtain a valid note to be deposited in a bank of their choice -or a limited amount of cash in some cases. Despite the prolonged lines of depositors asking for their funds at the suspended banks, the procedure was completed safely in a relatively short period 24 .
Also related to the maintenance of the payment system was the treatment of the checks drafted before the banking holiday against the accounts in the suspended banks. A Law was passed through Congress to include the suspension of banks as a determinant of check rejection, including them in the hypotheses of privileged status in terms of expeditious litigation for collecting debts. Through this, the holders of these checks could claim more easily their substitution by other means of payment. This task, although tedious, was apparently processed in an orderly manner with almost no resort to the Courts.
The task that remained after stopping the run was the resolution of the suspended banks. A usual bankruptcy process involving almost 2 billion dollars of assets would have been overwhelming, very risky for the maintenance of the payment channels and costly for the economy as a whole. Some attempts were made initially to obtain financial support from the private shareholders of Banco Comercial and Banco de Crédito that could have allowed the capitalization of any of them, including the possibility to incorporate other investors and depositors as shareholders. But the large amount of non-performing loans made it impossible that any of the suspended banks could be viable on its own.
The efforts where then redirected to obtain a legal framework that could allow:
 The establishment of a sort of Asset Management Company (AMC), able to perform financial activities, made from the accumulation of the performing credits of Banco Montevideo, Banco Caja Obrera and Banco Comercial 25 . The AMC was authorized to operate as a bank, named New Banco Comercial (NBC) 26 . The NBC opened its 24 Audits conducted subsequently on the uses of resources of the FSBS showed very little deviation from its scope.
25 Some non-performing credits but with good collateral or good prospects of being collected given the economic prospects of the debtor were also included. To enhance the solvency of the NBC, the offer included a put that gave the NBC the right to return to the liquidated banks all the loans that would remain non-performing by the end of December 2003. 26 The bank would later on be privatized. The seed capital of the NBC was constituted by the loans used as collateral of the financial assistance given by the government to the distressed banks through the FFSB. To isolate the NBC from legal contingencies affecting the liquidation of the suspended banks, the "good assets" were auctioned. NBC would finally be the only bidder. The proceeds of the auction were distributed among the creditors of the failed Banco Montevideo, Caja Obrera and Comercial, including the State. The government,
operations in March 2003, with its initial balance sheet showing total assets of one billion dollars and a net worth of US$ 150 million, in full compliance with the regulations of the Central Bank. Their liabilities were mostly certificate of deposits, scheduled to be amortized in six years.  The remaining assets of Banco Montevideo, Caja Obrera and Comercial were transferred to "liquidations funds", a legal framework created in December 2002, similar to a trust indenture, that allowed the Central Bank to manage those distressed assets under much more flexible rules than those applied in usual bankruptcy procedures, preserving the value of the assets and the businesses related to them. A similar procedure was applied to all the assets of Banco de Crédito, when the Central Bank decided to liquidate it in February 2003, when their private shareholders finally resigned to capitalize it. The "beneficiaries" in all of these "liquidation funds" were the former creditors of the failed banks, whose rights were allowed to be traded in the market 27 . The Central Bank outsourced the management of all the "liquidating funds" to private parties in 2004.
B. Early results
The daily reduction of dollar deposits of the non -financial sector in the banking system in the five working days previous to the banking holiday averaged US$ 130 million. On August 5 th , the first day after the Holiday, the outflow of dollar deposits reached an amount of US$ 136 million. The next day, another US$ 119 million left the banks. But by the last day of the week, withdrawals dropped to US$ 25 million. On Monday 12 th , a week after the reopening of the banks, the reduction of non -financial sector dollar deposits was only US$ 14 million. August 22 nd showed a positive day after months of darkness, and on September 27 th a week with a positive daily average was finally completed for the first time since the beginning of the nightmare.
The residents reacted more promptly to the new strategy, and in this case the run on dollar deposits effectively stopped in the first week of September. Non-residents reacted more cautiously and the withdrawals continued, with fluctuations, until the second half of October. Graph 6 shows the five-day variation of resident and non-resident deposits in the banking system, revealing a clear break in the behavior of economic agents after the implementation of the August Plan, although the recovery numbers would remain a long way from the huge drop that had been suffered until the new measures were implemented.
with the authorization of a law passed in December 2002, redistributed its share of the proceeds among the depositors, allowing the full recovery of the time deposits up to US$ 100 thousand. The sight deposits were fully recovered by depositors through the Fund for Stability of the Banking System, created in August 2002.
It is important to stress, at this point, that the reversal in the flow of deposits only became faster after the restructuring of the public debt in May 2003, as can be easily seen from Graph 6. The same chart shows that another episode of deposit withdrawals took place during the last week of January and the first week of February 2003, revealing that the August Plan allowed only for the first victory in a war, the end of which was still uncertain.
Other indicators can support the notion that the August Plan had only been the first step in the comeback from hell. The sentiment of economic agents in relation to the banking system can also be captured through the evolution of the interest rate for dollar time deposits and its spreads over international rates. As Graph 7 indicates, the interest rate paid by banking institutions for dollar time deposits and its spreads stabilized and began to decrease as the effects of the August Plan became more apparent. But only after the closing of the debt swap in May did the drop in interest rates and the spreads become more pronounced.
A distinctive feature of bank liabilities in the post-crisis period is the shortening of their maturity, due to their strong concentration in sight and saving deposits (see Graph 8). This preference of the depositors on short-term financial assets is a vestige of their behavior during the crisis and probably reflects the persistence of some degree of uncertainty about the solidity of the financial system. Moreover, the exit strategy from the crisis benefited the short -term deposits by trying to protect the payment system. Given that experience, it is plausible to think that depositors may have believed that sight accounts, in particular, would deserve greater support from the government in the future 28 .
Finally, the August Plan helped also to stop the drain on the international reserves of the Central Bank. After reaching US$ 554 million on August 14 th , international reserves began to increase gradually to a level around US$ 700 million, mainly supported by the increase in the deposits of the banking system in the Central Bank. Nevertheless it would not be possible to maintain this source of financing indefinitely. The counterpart of the use of international reserves borrowed from the banking system to meet public sector obligations is the reduction of the coverage of Central Bank liabilities with the banking system with international reserves. In fact, dollar deposits of financial institutions in the Central Bank exceeded international reserves by more than US$ 300 million by the end of September. And in February 2003, this number worsened to close to US$ 800 million.
The exchange rate jumped to $/U$S 32.4 in September 16 th 2002 in part as a result of problems in the microstructure of the foreign exchange market. To alleviate the extraordinary pressure on the market that was resulting in an acceleration of the devaluation of the peso, the Central Bank implemented in September a series of non-delivery forward contracts with Banco de la República to move the purchases of dollars required to sustain the net position in foreign currency of the latter towards December. After the NDF was implemented, the exchange rate fell by 10 percent over the next forty days.
The fragility of the situation became evident by the end of January 2003, when amidst rumors of pesoification of the Uruguayan debt and/or dollar deposits, an intense but fortunately short-lived run was triggered. It is worth noting that the implementation of the FSBS as an escrow account separated from international reserves proved to be effective to isolate international reserves from developments in the banking sector 29 .
In any case, the Summer 2003 run showed that a gap in terms of credibility still needed to be filled.
The following two sections will concentrate on the analysis of monetary policy and the public debt swap, explaining how they complemented the August Plan in the normalization of the Uruguayan financial system and allowed growth resumption. But it is important to note here that stopping the bank panic, stabilizing the financial variables and restructuring the debt were all indispensable for Uruguay to emerge from the crisis, but were issues that needed to be dealt with sequentially. Three arguments lay behind the sequential approach:
 The assessment of debt sustainability is heavily distorted if actual relative prices are far from equilibrium, a situation that is quite characteristic of a period of great turbulence. Stop the run, regain control over inflation and a stable nominal exchange rate path become prerequisites of a reasonable evaluation of the intertemporal solvency of the public sector, which is the basis for the design of the debt management policy.

The Uruguayan authorities placed great emphasis on facing the problem of the debt under a cooperative approach with investors, hoping to create the basis for a fast return to market access. Avoiding the default until the restructuring of the debt was settled was considered a major difference from the Argentinean approach and a sign of good faith. But this strategy implied that the restructuring of the debt should not be implemented in a period with heavy debt service, because the uncertainties surrounding the transaction could trigger capital outflows, which would be facilitated by the payments of the government. Given the importance of the deposits of the banking system in the Central Bank as sources of funds, it was considered important that debt service should be made under a favorable climate, to prevent capital outflows.
Uruguayan authorities were concerned about the negative effects that a default on the public debt or a non-friendly restructuring proposal could have on the deposits in the banking system, particularly in public banks. 29 Deposit withdrawals between January 29 th and February 6 th amounted to US$ 355 million, while, in the same period, international reserves of the Central Bank dropped only US$ 43 millions, mostly due to foreign currency obligations of the public sector.
C. The Role of Monetary Policy
The jump in the exchange rate that followed the decision to float had an impacted on the level of prices. The annualized inflation rate in the third quarter of 2002 was 71.5%, after accumulating only 6.5% in the twelve months through May. A new nominal anchor should be introduced to stop the accelerating path of inflation and restore stability in the foreign exchange market.
Despite the noise introduced by the modification in the monetary regime on June 20 th , the level of international reserves left after the banking holiday (around US$ 600 million) was completely insufficient to sustain a credible return to a crawling peg regime, even with the flexibility of a broad target zone. The use of the exchange rate as nominal anchor was ruled out -notwithstanding it being the most efficient instrument to reduce inflation in a highly dollarized open economy -and an active monetary policy through the control of money aggregates was implemented.
Three stages can be recognized in the implementation and operation of the new monetary policy framework. The first, basically a test period, corresponds to the last four months of 2002. In that phase, the Central Banks tightened monetary policy and tried to develop a market for peso-denominated instruments, which consisted mainly of short-term Treasury bills (TB). Efforts were also made to place the first inflation-indexed notes, using the recently created Indexed Unit (IU). These notes (CBIUN) were issued by the Central Bank for monetary control purposes, trying to absorb the excess of liquidity left in the market resulting from the access granted to depositors to their peso sight and saving deposits in the suspended banks 30 . The monetary tightening was supported by an increase in legal reserve requirements for peso deposits (it went up to 30% from 20% in the case of sight deposits).
Monetary tightening curbed the rise of inflation observed in the third quarter of 2002. The annualized increase in consumer prices in the fourth quarter was 11 percent, much lower than the 71.5 percent registered in the third. During this first stage, stabilization of the exchange rate was achieved 31 and the interest rate for the TB was halved from above 150 percent levels in September to the still high 60 percent by year-end. The Central Bank performed during this period a test of its ability to meet the targets internally committed on the Monetary Base, obtaining satisfactory results.
Given this progress, the Central Bank announced its targets for Monetary Base for the following year, 2003. In this second stage, the target was established assuming an inflation rate of 27 percent for that year, but the improvement in the macroeconomic environment after the debt exchange determined a higher demand for money than that originally envisaged. The debt swap lowered the expectations of foreign currency needs for the public sector, and consequently the economic agents revised the expected devaluation of the Uruguayan currency downward. Together with the lower expected depreciation, interest rates in pesos collapsed to levels below 20 percent from the 60 percent observed at the beginning of the year.
A lower-than-expected devaluation and interest rates, better growth performance and the absence of significant pressures on wages and prices of non-tradable goods, given the excess capacity that the Uruguayan economy had at that time, determined better results in terms of inflation than those assumed in the program: 10.2 percent against the 27 percent originally projected. Despite that, the Central Bank kept its Monetary Base targets unchanged, and seized the opportunity to reduce legal reserves for peso deposits below the requirements for deposits in dollars, consistently with the adequate evaluation of risks in the banking sector 32 .
Building on the credibility obtained after the first year of application of the new monetary regime, the Central Bank took another step in 2004, changing the priority of the monetary policy. Instead of adhering strictly to a monetary target, the emphasis started to shift towards the accomplishment of an inflation target, revising the monetary targets when needed. Under this scheme, at the end of each quarter the Central Bank announces the inflation target for the following twelve months, changing if necessary the monetary targets announced at the end of the previous quarter.
What is clearly seen from Graphs 9 and 10 is that, even with the inconveniences noted above about the accuracy of a monetary policy based on Monetary Base targets, the Central Bank succeeded in stabilizing inflation and changing expectations on key financial variables, like the exchange rate and the interest rate.
A more stable environment in the exchange market opened the door to foreign exchange purchases by the Central Bank aimed at rebuilding its net position in foreign currency, which had seriously deteriorated in the third quarter of 2002 33 .
D. Debt Restructuring
Stopping the bank-run and rebuilding the appropriate functioning of the financial system were only the first steps to address the fragilities of the Uruguayan economy. Not just the substantial jump in the debt-to-GDP ratio after the devaluation of the peso (from 54 percent in 2001 to 92 percent in 2002) had changed the fundamentals of the debt dynamics. The high concentration of debt amortizations, the sudden-stop in the access to capital markets and the reduced level of international reserves introduced a financial gap starting in the fourth quarter of 2002 and thereafter, which contributed to the perception of many analysts, investment bankers and rating agencies that the Uruguayan debt had entered an unsustainable path.
In August 2002, the authorities agreed with the IMF a sort of "private sector involvement" in the resolution of the debt problem, that would be finalized before the conclusion of the Second Review of the program with the IMF, scheduled for October. But the goals of the Uruguayan government regarding the debt restructuring did not seem to be consistent with the diagnostic that the IMF had in August 2002 about public debt dynamics. The debt outlook had deteriorated sharply since June, basically due to the increase of the Uruguayan debt with IFIs after the bailout of August and the sharp depreciation of the peso after the float. With that perspective in mind, the IMF staff was reluctant to conclude the Second Review of the program accepting a proposal of debt restructuring elaborated under the assumption that the problem with the Uruguayan public debt was merely a liquidity issue 34 .
The different views about the appropriate strategy to deal with the debt problem delayed the conclusion of the Second Review towards the beginning of 2003, when the improvement in macroeconomic conditions, paired with the sense of urgency that the summer run on the banking sector brought about, facilitated the convergence among the different views on debt sustainability and the magnitude of the financial gap in 2003 -2005 35 . In February 2003 the Fund agreed to support a comprehensive debt exchange, the main elements of which would be:
 Voluntary participation of bondholders in the debt exchange, based on the expectation of market-value recovery associated with the improvement in the Uruguayan capacity to pay.  Inclusion of all dollar-denominated bonds as eligible, except for short-term instruments issued since January 2003. This amounted to US$ 5.4 billion of principal, of which: i) US$ 1.6 billion were domestically issued bonds, ii) US$ 3.5 billion corresponded to international bonds issued under foreign law, and iii) US$ 250 million were one bond issued in Japan.  Uruguay should remain current on all its financial obligations until the closing of the exchange.  A consultation process with bondholders should precede the launching of the offer, during which the terms would be determined. The authorities saw this consultation as an important element in their approach 36 .  The support from IFIs would be needed, including an initial disbursement from the IMF devoted to rebuilding international reserves and preventing any disruption in the financial system after the announcement of the debt exchange.
A key risk factor of the Uruguayan approach was the level of participation in the debt exchange. One of the main concerns of the IMF with the voluntary approach was the deemed low incentive of bondholders to participate voluntarily in a debt restructuring due to coordination problems in collective action (Krueger, 2003) .
But as De Brun and Dellamea (2003) show, the holdout problem is usually overstated. If the debt restructuring adds value to bondholders in relation to recovery values in the event of default, very high values of the probability of continuing servicing the debt must be assigned to make the decision to hold out a rational one. Moreover, if the debt exchange is perceived to be difficult, bondholders will be induced to participate, expecting a better treatment even if the transaction fails 37 .
The communication strategy of the Uruguayan government emphasized the commitment of the authorities to complete the exchange only if 90 percent participation was reached.
To encourage participation, moderate use of the exit consents and regulatory incentives for domestic financial institutions was introduced. The exit consents were designed basically to protect the payments under the new bonds from eventual legal actions of holdouts and to establish a structure in which the "old" bonds would be considered as subordinated debt in relation to the new bonds. The regulatory changes served a similar purpose in the case of the bonds issued domestically. Besides, the exit consents and the regulatory changes reduced the liquidity of the "old" bonds that would remain outstanding, eliminating the requirement of public listing of their prices in both domestic and international markets.
The exchange offered bondholders two options, both involving approximately a par-for-par exchange:
 Maturity extension option: proposed to change only the maturity of bonds (generally adding five years).  Benchmark bond option: proposed the exchange of existing bonds for "benchmark" bonds, longer-dated than the maturity extension bonds but with higher amount outstanding, offering more liquidity in secondary markets. Three external and four domestic benchmark bonds were introduced. With the reopening of the 2011 benchmark bond, made a couple of weeks after the closing of the exchange, the three external bonds were large enough to be included in the EMBI.
A legal innovation of the new bonds was the introduction of CACs with an aggregation clause. Given the scope of the transaction, after the debt exchange almost all the Uruguayan market debt issued in international markets contains this instrument 38 .
The participation rate was finally 93 percent, 99 percent in domestic bonds (see De Brun and Dellamea, 2003, for more details on the transaction).
E. Back from hell
The success of this transaction brought visible benefits on the developments of the Uruguayan economy in the immediate future. The confidence in the financial situation improved and the dollar-denominated deposits in the banking system began to increase at a faster pace than that observed in the previous months. The confidence of the consumer and investors also improved, and domestic private absorption began to fuel aggregate demand, adding to the role played by exports in the first half of 2003. Because of this, GDP grew at double-digit figures in the second half of 2003, a trend that would continue during 2004.
The resumption of domestic consumption and growth helped to improve fiscal numbers, allowing the primary surplus to rise from 0.2 percent of GDP in 2002 to 2.9 percent in 2003. The better outlook of the Uruguayan debt, as shown in Graph 15, where the amortization schedule before and after the exchange is shown, together with the economic recovery and the consolidation of the fiscal situation, favored a collapse in the Uruguayan spreads and allowed a fast return to international markets. In October 2003, Uruguay was the first emerging country in many decades to issue an international bond denominated in domestic currency.
The restored confidence was reflected in a resumption of capital inflows, inducing a reversal of the overshooting in the exchange rate and facilitating a pronounced reduction in domestic interest rates. Those developments allowed a rapid increase of international reserves, closing the sold position in foreign currency and the gap between the reserves and the obligations in foreign currency of the Central Bank with the financial system. The stabilization of the financial system brought with it an increased margin of maneuver to the Central Bank, facilitating the operation of the new instruments of monetary policy. The market for fixedrate notes issued by the Central Bank to control monetary aggregates could be deepened, and the same scenario applied to longer-term instruments like inflation-indexed notes. A gradual process of de-dollarization of the public debt could be started.
V. LESSONS
The case of Uruguay allows us to draw a rich set of lessons in several issues ranging from structural reforms in the safety net of the financial system to the day-to-day management of a financial crisis.
I. Structural Issues.
We have identified a set of structural factors that could either be identified as causes of the crisis or propagation mechanisms.
1.
Problems in the design of the safety net of the banking system led to financial fragilities that fostered the crisis. First, the existence of guarantees both on the exchange rate (target zone) and on deposits (implicit deposit insurance) gave wrong incentives for risk evaluation. The implicit deposit insurance scheme also generated a link between public debt sustainability and the soundness of the banking sector.
2.
The regulation, in particular regarding liquidity risk, favored activity in foreign currency.
3.
There was no regulatory treatment of cross-border risk that could prevent the risk taking behavior of the regional banks in Argentina. Dollarization prevents a fair evaluation of the fiscal stance for several reasons. First, when the debt is in dollars usual indicators of debt sustainability might be biased. In particular, if the real exchange rate is below its long-term equilibrium values, the debt to GDP indicator underestimates the real indebtedness of a country. Furthermore, the fiscal flows are also misleading. We have shown that interest payments are a very important part of the procyclicality of fiscal policy in countries with dollarized public debt. As the real exchange rate is procyclical, the burden of interest payments goes down both because nominal payments are reduced following falls in spreads and the real value of those payments is lower with a cheaper dollar.
II. Banking crisis
Once the run starts, there is a need for an early assessment of sustainability of banks and public debt. To provide a prompt response it is necessary to have a coordinated intervention from both the IMF and domestic institutions, like the Central Bank. Domestic institutions are able to identify the problem early on; however, the political system is biased towards thinking that problems are smaller than they really are, delaying the design of a solution strategy. The IMF can play a role in adding a "sense of urgency" derived from its experience in crisis management.
Once the extent of the crisis has been identified, a full-fledged strategy has to be clearly communicated to the public to restore confidence. We have shown that the slow response of the government in the Uruguayan case, as well as the lack of coordination evident in the resolution strategy in the first two failed attempts, damaged the credibility of very large assistance plans.
While it is difficult to get involved in a de-dollarization strategy with a pegged exchange rate regime, the switch to a floating exchange rate regime in a dollarized economy is also full of challenges if it is made in the midst of a financial crisis, with expectations playing a crucial role. With large currency mismatches in both public and private sector, a sharp depreciation of the currency worsens the perception of the sustainability of both the financial system and public debt. Furthermore, the regime switch accompanied with a "jump" in the exchange rate operates as a coordination device for moral hazard on the side of debtors, whose lobbying activities can only further deteriorate the soundness of the banking sector.
There are several things to learn from the Uruguayan crisis regarding the lender of last resort (LOLR) in small-dollarized economies. First, it has been proven that IFIs can provide the needed liquidity assistance, effectively performing LOLR responsibilities with no significant problems of moral hazard involved. Second, it is clear that, since domestic central banks cannot issue dollars, liquidity requirements should be higher in dollars than in pesos. Third, if the central bank performs LOLR functions in dollars with its own international reserves, a perverse link between public accounts and the financial system is created. The Uruguayan episode shows how the fall of international reserves, due to their visibility, can generate herding on depositors of the financial system. Finally, if the IMF takes on the LOLR functions in dollars, the assistance has to be up front and cannot follow the usual drop-bydrop disbursement pattern of the standard stand-by program.
While restoring debt sustainability is a must in these situations, the bank run must be stopped first to see the real extent of the shock on the sustainability of public debt. In the middle of banking panics, issues like the path of potential GDP, equilibrium real exchange rates and future public finances are extremely hard to assess. As a consequence, the sustainability of public debt cannot be assessed properly and rushing the restructuring of public debt may lead to a new renegotiation in the future, and therefore to long-term fiscal uncertainty.
In the long term, the legacy of the Uruguayan crisis is one that stresses the role of institutional stability. Through the roughest of times, the normal working of institutions was not interrupted. Private contracts were respected, the charter of the central bank, particularly with respect to inflationary finance, was not breached, and political stability was preserved. The fast recovery of the Uruguayan economy seems to favor the strategy followed. However, the question remains of whether a deeper solution should have been undertaken, particularly on the fiscal front. 
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